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OPINION
_________
McKEE, Chief Judge
Wayne Coombs appeals from the district court’s denial
of the habeas corpus petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
2241(c)(3) and 2254.  He argues that the prosecutor exercised
his peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986).  For the reasons set forth below, we will
3remand this matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing
on Coombs’ Batson challenge.
I. Factual Background
On February 22, 2000, Coombs was arrested for a string
of robberies that took place in Philadelphia from the fall of 1999
into the winter of 2000.  The charges stemming from those
robberies were consolidated for a trial which began in
September 2001.  At that trial, the majority of the prosecution’s
evidence came from eyewitnesses who identified Coombs as the
armed robber.  Coombs’ mother testified on his behalf.  Both
Coombs and his mother are Black.  Nearly all of the prosecution
witnesses, including the robbery victims and police officers, are
White.  The trial ended in a hung jury.
Coombs was re-tried beginning in November 2001.  On
the first day of voir dire, the prosecutor raised a “reverse
Batson” challenge because defense counsel struck three White
     See Georgia v McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding1
that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a defendant from
exercising peremptory challenges to strike jurors based upon
their race). 
4
jurors.   The prosecutor told the court that, “[i]t happened the1
last time, but I didn’t do anything about it.  I’m doing something
about it this time.”  App. at 106.  Defense counsel provided the
following explanation for his peremptory strikes: (1) Juror No.
35 stated that she would be more likely to believe police officers
than another citizen and she had two friends that had been
abducted from the street;  (2) Juror No. 8 had two brothers-in-
law who were retired police officers, a couple of her neighbors
were police officers, and she was married to a firefighter; and
(3) Juror No. 21 indicated that “she would have problems . . .
following instructions that the defendant doesn’t have to take
the stand or present evidence, and that it couldn’t be held against
him if he elects to remain silent,” her father-in-law was a retired
5police sergeant, she stated that she would be inclined to believe
the testimony of a police officer, and she worked at a bank that
had been robbed.  App. at 106-09.  
Defense counsel also raised a Batson challenge based on
the prosecutor’s use of two peremptory strikes against Black
females.  Defense counsel told the court that “the last jury hung
because of a [B]lack female. Today we had two [B]lack females.
Both of them have been stricken for no good reasons.”  App. at
110.  The court then asked the prosecutor: “Why don’t you just
put your reasons on the record?”  Id.  The prosecutor initially
responded that defense counsel is “just retaliating for what I
did,” id., but then said that he struck Juror No. 19 because she
“was an eyewitness to a shooting, and her mother was robbed,
she said, a long time ago.”  App. at 110-12.  He stated that he
struck Juror No. 14 because his brother “was charged with
robbery over fifteen years ago.”  Id. 
6The court denied both motions, stating:  “These are what
lawyers do with peremptory challenges.  They’re not race-based.
. . .  As long as we have peremptory challenges, lawyers are
going to make judgments maybe based on hunches, maybe based
on prior experiences, maybe based on feelings, but they’re not
based on race.  Both of you are much too good lawyers to do
something like that.”  App. at 112.
At the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel again
raised the Batson challenge.  He noted that the prosecutor used
five of his six peremptory challenges to strike Black venire
persons, and more specifically, that the prosecutor had used four
peremptory strikes against Black females and one against a
Black male.  App. at 138.  Before the prosecutor could offer a
racially-neutral explanation, as required under Batson, the trial
court stated: “I’m not finding there’s another pattern.”  Id.  The
prosecutor nevertheless explained that Juror No. 22's cousin had
7been a witness to a robbery and that Juror No. 4 had a nephew
who had recently been shot, another nephew in jail awaiting gun
charges, and a friend who was a defense attorney.  
After the prosecutor concluded, defense counsel
questioned the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory strike to remove
Juror No. 1, a Black male.  The prosecutor’s entire explanation
was as follows: 
I just didn’t like him, your Honor. I don’t really
have a sound reason. . . . I don’t know, just the
way he was looking at me. 
If that’s a reason, it’s justified, but your Honor
found there’s no pattern. I mean, I just didn’t like
him, and he didn’t check off many boxes, but I
went with my hunch. . . .
         
 App. at 140.  
The court’s only response was: “Let’s go. Are we ready
to? Do we have the bills?” Id.  Defense counsel then inquired:
“Your Honor is going to accept the Commonwealth’s assertions
8and deny my motion?”  The court answered: “Yes.”  Id. 
The court did not further inquire into his explanation.
The final composition of the jury in Coombs’ second trial
consisted of one Black male, one Black female, and ten White
jurors.  The jury convicted Coombs of nine counts of robbery
and two counts of possessing an instrument of crime in violation
of 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3701 and  907, respectively.
At Coombs’ sentencing, defense counsel again raised the
issue of the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges.  Counsel first
tried to clarify the record with regard to two of the venire
persons who did not indicate their race on the juror
questionnaire.  App. at 148.  He asked that the record indicate
that Juror No. 14 was a Black female and that Juror No. 9, who
was chosen for the jury, was a White male.  When the court
asked the prosecutor if he would stipulate to the race of the two
jurors, the prosecutor responded, “I don’t recall [Juror No. 14],
9but I do recall the [Juror No. 9] as being a [W]hite male.”  App.
at 149.  
Defense counsel then tried to introduce evidence of a
conversation that he alleged had taken place between himself
and the prosecutor.  He argued that it was relevant to the
prosecutor’s exercise of peremptory strikes.  However, before he
could elaborate, the prosecutor interjected: “I object to this
because I don’t think this information should be before the
Court. It’s complete hearsay.”  App. at 150.  Defense counsel
argued that the conversation was relevant to establishing the
discriminatory motive behind the prosecutor’s peremptory
strikes.  However, the court refused to allow defense counsel to
proceed because in its view, the conversation was “not relevant
to anything.”  App. at 152.  Defense counsel’s multiple attempts
to explain the conversation’s relevancy were cut off by the
court’s continued insistence that “[i]t’s irrelevant.”  App. at 151-
10
52.  The court did, however, tell defense counsel that he could
“submit an affidavit,” adding that it “[did not] want to get into
that.”  Id.
Defense counsel later submitted an affidavit, which stated
that he had a conversation with the prosecutor after the first trial
but before the second trial.  App. at 156-57.  The prosecutor
purportedly said to him that a juror from the first trial had
advised him that there had been only one holdout juror, and that
this juror was a Black female.  Defense counsel also explained
that he had an additional conversation with the prosecutor after
the second trial concluded but before sentencing.  Defense
counsel stated that the prosecutor said to him that the Black
female juror from the first trial “had voted not guilty because the
defendant was [B]lack and she was [B]lack.”  App. at 156.
Defense counsel believed that those statements were relevant to
determining if the prosecutor’s experience during the first trial
      The Spence rule requires an appellant raising a Batson2
challenge “to make a record identifying the race of
venirepersons stricken by the Commonwealth, the race of
prospective jurors acceptable to the Commonwealth but
stricken by the defense, and the racial composition of the final
jury selected.”  Commonwealth v. Holloway, 739 A.2d 1039,
1045 (Pa. 1999) (internal quotations omitted).
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caused him to try to exclude Black jurors from the second jury.
The trial court denied Coombs’ post-trial motions and
sentenced him to 59-to-165 years in prison.  Coombs appealed
to the Pennsylvania Superior Court alleging, inter alia, that the
prosecutor had discriminated against Black venire persons
during jury selection in violation of Batson.  The Superior Court
rejected Coombs’ claims without reaching the merits of the
Batson claims.  Commonwealth v. Coombs, 832 A.2d 534 (table)
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2003), No. 954 E.D. App. 2002, slip op. at 5 (Pa.
Super. Ct. July 21, 2003).  The court ruled that those claims had
not been raised as required by Pennsylvania’s “Spence rule.”2
       After Coombs filed his habeas petition, the3
Commonwealth filed an unopposed motion to stay the
proceedings pending the outcome of the petition for certiorari
that had been filed in Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707 (3d
Cir. 2004), as both parties believed that case could effect the
resolution of Coombs’ habeas petition.  The Supreme Court
subsequently denied certiorari in that case.  See Beard v.
Holloway, 543 U.S. 976 (2004).
12
It held that, “where an appellant fails to make a record for
review of a Batson challenge [as required by the Spence rule],
this Court is unable to consider a claim that the trial court failed
to find a prima facie case under Batson.”  Id. (internal
quotations omitted).  Thereafter, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied discretionary review, Commonwealth v. Coombs,
841 A.2d 528 (Pa. 2003), and Coombs filed the habeas petition
that is now before us. 
In his habeas petition, Coombs again alleges that the
prosecution discriminated against Black venire persons in
violation of Batson.   The petition was referred to a Magistrate3
13
Judge who issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”)
recommending that the petition be dismissed.  The district court
adopted the R&R and denied Coombs’ habeas petition.  The
district court ruled that Coombs’ Batson claim was subject to the
deferential standard of review set forth in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), and that
Coombs had failed to demonstrate that the state courts’ decision
was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
Batson, as required for relief under AEDPA.  This appeal
followed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 2253(a).  Our review of the district court’s legal
conclusions is plenary.  Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 713
(3d Cir. 2004).  Where a district court “‘did not hold an
evidentiary hearing and engage in independent fact-finding, but
14
rather limited the habeas evidence to that found in the state court
record,’ our review of its final judgment is plenary.” Hardcastle
v. Horn, 368 F.3d 246, 254 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Scarbrough
v. Johnson, 300 F.3d 302, 305 (3d Cir. 2002)).
III. Discussion
A. Deference Under the AEDPA
Under the AEDPA, “a state prisoner’s habeas petition
must be denied as to any claim that was ‘adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings’ unless the adjudication was
‘contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of
the United States,’ or was ‘based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the State court proceeding.’”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 718
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) & (2)).  “We have interpreted
§ 2254(d)’s ‘adjudication on the merits’ language to mean that
      In Holloway, we also concluded that even if we applied4
the AEDPA deferential standard, applying the Spence rule to
bar a Batson violation was “‘contrary to’ and an
‘unreasonable application of’ the Batson standard.”  355 F.3d
at 729.  See also Abu-Jamal v. Horn, 520 F.3d 272 (3d Cir.
15
‘when, although properly preserved by the defendant, the state
court has not reached the merits of a claim thereafter presented
to a federal habeas court, the deferential standards provided by
AEDPA . . . do not apply.’” Id. (quoting Appel v. Horn, 250
F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2001) (additional citations omitted).  
In Holloway, we concluded that because the state court
found it “‘impossible to determine’ whether Holloway’s
underlying Batson claim ‘has arguable merit,’ it plainly did not
render an ‘adjudication on the merits’ of that claim for purposes
of applying the AEDPA standards.”  Id. at 719 (applying the
pre-AEDPA standard where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
dismissed a PCRA claim that alleged a Batson violation because
the claim did not meet Spence’s procedural requirements).4
2008), vacated and remanded on other grounds by Beard v.
Abu-Jamal, 130 S. Ct. 1134 (2010).
16
Coombs’ claim here was treated the same as Holloway’s was.
In both cases, the state appellate court refused to address the
merits of the Batson claim because the defendant had not
satisfied the requirements of Pennsylvania’s Spence rule.
 Inasmuch as the state courts did not reach the merits of
Coombs’ Batson  challenge, our review of that claim is not
subject to AEDPA’s deferential standard, and we therefore
afford de novo review.  Nevertheless, we still presume that the
state courts’ conclusions of fact are correct unless, inter alia,
they are not “fairly supported by the record.”  28 U.S.C.
§2254(d)(8); Holloway, 355 F.3d at 719. 
B. The Appropriate Batson Inquiry. 
The Equal Protection Clause “prohibits a prosecutor from
using a peremptory challenge to strike a prospective juror solely
17
on account of race.”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 719 (citing Batson,
476 U.S. at 88).  “As in any equal protection case, the burden is
. . . on the defendant who alleges discriminatory selection of the
venire to prove the existence of purposeful discrimination.”
Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).  However, a Batson challenge is not defeated merely
because the prosecutor purports to offer a race-neutral reason for
striking the juror.  Rather, “the rule in Batson . . . requires the
judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all
evidence with a bearing on it.”  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S.
231, 251-52 (2005) (emphasis added). 
Thus, Batson, “establish[ed] a three-step inquiry for
determining the constitutionality of challenged peremptory
strikes.”  Hardcastle, 368 F.3d at 255 (citing Riley v. Taylor,
277 F.3d 261, 275 (3d Cir. 2001)).  When a Batson challenge is
raised, “[f]irst, the trial court must determine whether the
      The state argues, and the district court agreed, that a5
prosecutor need only express a race-neutral reason—even if is
“implausible”—for striking the juror to overcome a Batson
challenge.  Coombs v. Diguglielmo, Civ. No. 04-1841, slip op.
at 9 (E.D. Pa. February 29, 2008).  However, that is
misleading.  The prosecutor need only state a race-neutral
reason to satisfy step two of the Batson analysis, but the trial
18
defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor
exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race.”  Rice v.
Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338 (2006).  “Second, if the showing is
made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-
neutral explanation for striking the juror in question.”  Id. (citing
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98).  “Third, the court must then
determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of
proving purposeful discrimination.”  Id. (citing Batson, 476 U.S.
at 98).  
 Thus, “in considering a Batson objection . . . all of the
circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must
be consulted.”  Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008).5
court must conduct an analysis of the proffered reason for the
strike under step three to determine if the reason the
prosecutor offers is merely a pretext designed to mask the
improper consideration of race to exclude jurors.  Johnson v.
California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 (2005) (citing Purkett v. Elem,
514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)).  Indeed, merely accepting any
purportedly race-neutral reason that a skilled attorney can
conjure up in response to a Batson challenge would reduce the
process of resolving Batson challenges to a farcical ritual. 
19
A trial court should look to all of the evidence and surrounding
circumstances, including the context in which strikes were
exercised, to determine whether the prosecutor’s proffered
reasons for striking a juror are pretextual and whether the
defendant has shown that the prosecutor had a discriminatory
intent.  See Riley, 277 F.3d at 283 (stating that evidence
pertaining to a Batson challenge “should not be reviewed in
isolation”).  As the Court explained in Snyder, “all of the
circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must
be consulted.”  552 U.S. at 478 (citing Miller-El, 545 U.S. at
239) (finding a Batson challenge had merit where the “trial
20
judge simply allowed the challenge without explanation”). 
 Thus, “the prosecutor’s questions and statements . . .
may support or refute an inference of discriminatory purpose,”
Holloway, 355 F.3d at 727 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97),
and the three-step inquiry for resolving Batson claims allows the
trial court to respond to a Batson challenge in a meaningful,
rather than a pro forma, manner.  Trial courts fail to engage in
the required analysis when they “fail[] to examine all of the
evidence to determine whether the State’s proffered race-neutral
explanations [a]re pretextual.”  Riley, 277 F.3d at 286.
The prosecutor’s “strike rate” when compared to the final
composition of the jury is particularly relevant.  Miller-El, 545
U.S. at 241.  “More powerful . . . are side-by-side comparisons
of some [B]lack venire panelists who were struck and [W]hite
panelists allowed to serve.  If a prosecutor’s proffered reason for
striking a [B]lack panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-
21
similar non[B]lack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence
tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at
Batson’s third step.” Id. (emphasis added).  See also Riley, 277
F.3d at 282 (finding that this comparison “is relevant to
determining whether the prosecution’s asserted justification for
striking the black juror is pretextual”).  
“[T]he requirement that the state courts faced with a
Batson challenge engage in the critical step three analysis is not
a product of our own creativity but an accepted element of a
habeas court’s obligation to examine whether a defendant’s
constitutional right to a race-neutral jury has been infringed.”
Riley, 377 F.3d at 290 (internal citations omitted).  “Although a
judge considering a Batson challenge is not required to comment
explicitly on every piece of evidence in the record, some
engagement with the evidence considered is necessary as part of
step three of the Batson inquiry.”  Id. at 289.  See also
      Indeed, even if we were to apply the deferential AEDPA6
standard, a state court’s “[f]ailure to make a step-three finding
. . . would render the state court’s decision either ‘contrary to’
or an ‘unreasonable application’ of Batson.”  Bond v. Beard,
539 F.3d 256, 264 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Hardcastle, 368 F.3d
at 259).  
22
Holloway, 355 F.3d at 712 (remanding where “the trial court
rendered no express or otherwise articulated ruling on [the
defendant’s] objections; instead, it implicitly rejected the Batson
challenge by letting the matter proceed to trial”).   6
In Hardcastle, after examining the record, we stated that
“we cannot conclude . . . that the [state courts’] resolution of
[the defendant’s] claim amounted to an objectively reasonable
application of Batson . . . [because the state court] failed to
conduct a full and complete step three analysis.”  368 F.3d at
       In Hardcastle, we were applying the deferential AEDPA7
standard and yet, we still remanded the case for an evidentiary
hearing after finding that the state court’s application of
Batson was unreasonable under clearly established federal
law.
23
255.   Where the state court fails to undertake a full step three7
analysis, as required by Batson, we will remand for the district
court to engage in independent fact-finding.  Id.   
Here, as in Hardcastle, the trial court failed to conduct a
full and complete Batson step three analysis.  In Hardcastle, the
prosecutor wanted to provide the trial court with relevant
information regarding her reasons for exercising twelve
peremptory strikes against Black venire persons but the trial
court refused to hear the evidence.  Id. at 251.  Hardcastle’s
counsel moved for a mistrial and the following exchange
occurred:
The Court: I’m not going to argue the point. There’s no need
to. I’m going to deny your motion.  Your record is correct, and
24
we now proceed. Is there any other motion?
Prosecutor: May I put something on the record with regard to
the issue?
The Court: No.
Prosecutor: Not in defense.
The Court: No.
Prosecutor: Okay.
The Court: Now that gets rid of the problem. 
Id. at n.1.
Here, as in Hardcastle, it is clear from the record that the
court effectively omitted the third step of the Batson inquiry by
unreasonably limiting the defendant’s opportunity to prove that
the prosecutor’s proffered reasons for striking Black jurors were
pretextual, thereby improperly restricting the defendant’s ability
to prove discriminatory intent.  
Moreover, the court did not make the findings required
under Batson.  Rather, it appears to have dismissed Coombs’
Batson claim because it believed the defense attorney and the
prosecutor were “much too good lawyers to do something like
      The trial court did this analysis only after the fact, in a8
memorandum opinion prepared for the state appeal.  This
analysis was not considered by the state appellate court
because the state appellate court did not reach the merits of
this issue.
25
that.”  Relying upon its view of counsel’s competence and/or
professionalism, the court failed to inquire into whether the
prosecutor’s purported reasons for striking the jurors were
pretextual, a crucial part of the third step of Batson.8
Even more troubling is the fact that the court did not
examine the prosecutor’s statements that he struck Juror No. 1
because he “just didn’t like” the juror and because the juror was
giving him “bad looks.”  Although the prosecutor did explain
that the juror “didn’t check off many boxes [on the jury
questionnaire],” the court’s insistence that the trial proceed
(“let’s go”) foreclosed any inquiry into whether the prosecutor
accepted White jurors who checked off a similar number of
26
boxes.  That would have been an essential part of any
meaningful inquiry into the prosecutor’s explanation.  As we
have just noted, “side-by-side comparisons” of Black jurors who
were struck and White jurors who were allowed to serve can
often be particularly “powerful” in a Batson inquiry. Miller-El,
545 U.S. at 241. 
As also noted earlier, the prosecutor’s response to
defense counsel’s challenge to the dismissal of Juror No. 1 also
included the concession that: “I don’t really have a sound
reason.”  On this record, there is no way of knowing if the
prosecutor’s action was motivated by a genuine concern for
Juror No. 1's impartiality, or whether the prosecutor’s
misgivings arose from the fact that the juror was Black.  We do
not intend to suggest an answer to that question.  We do,
however, require that an appropriate inquiry be undertaken by
the court in response to a Batson challenge; particularly given
27
the prosecutor’s vague and elusive explanation and the apparent
concession that he was not sure why he stuck Juror No. 1.  
Like anyone else, trial attorneys possess those human
frailties that make each of us far too susceptible to social
conditioning and the subliminal bias that may result.  Thus,
although we do not suggest this happened here, we are reminded
of Justice Marshall’s observation in Batson that “[an attorney’s]
own conscious or unconscious racism may lead him easily to the
conclusion that a prospective black juror is ‘sullen,’ or ‘distant,’
a characterization that would not have come to his mind if a
white juror had acted identically.”  476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J.
concurring).  Accordingly, “outright prevarication by [attorneys
is not] the only danger . . . It is even possible that an attorney
may lie to himself in an effort to convince himself that his
motives are legal.”  Id. (internal citation and quotations
omitted).  Although we again stress that we are not suggesting
28
what this prosecutor’s motivation was, trial court’s must be
particularly vigilant when Black jurors are struck because an
attorney is acting on a “hunch.”
This means that a trial court must be exceedingly careful
about rejecting a Batson challenge merely because the
prosecutor explains that s/he did not like the way a juror looked
at her/him.  Although counsel’s discomfort with real or
perceived “looks” from a prospective juror may arise from
factors that would readily survive a Batson challenge after an
appropriate inquiry, Justice Marshall’s admonition in Batson
cautions that such discomfort may not similarly arise if a White
juror looks at counsel the same way.  Therefore, courts should
not allow nebulous expressions of discomfort to justify striking
a juror.  Batson requires an appropriately tailored inquiry, an
opportunity for opposing counsel to argue that the proffered
reasons are pretextual, and a finding by the trial court.   If it
29
were otherwise—and an unexamined explanation were allowed
to survive a Batson challenge, Batson inquires would quickly be
reduced to a meaningless procedural ritual. 
We realize that it may be uncomfortable and unpleasant
for a trial judge to undertake such a difficult and subtle inquiry
with the precision and persistence that may be required to
determine counsel’s true reasons for striking a juror.  No judge
wants to be in the position of suggesting that a fellow
professional - whom the judge may have known for years - is
exercising peremptory challenges based on forbidden racial
considerations.  However, we also realize that if Batson is to be
given its full effect, trial courts must make precise and difficult
inquiries to determine if the proffered reasons for a peremptory
strike are the race-neutral reasons they purport to be, or if they
are merely a pretext for that which Batson forbids. 
Nor is it relevant that the prosecutor appears to have
30
offered race-neutral explanations for all but one peremptory
challenge.  “[A] prosecutor’s purposeful discrimination in
excluding even a single juror on account of race cannot be
tolerated as consistent with the guarantee of equal protection
under the law.”  Holloway, 355 F.3d at 720 (citing Harrison v.
Ryan, 909 F.2d 84, 88 (3d Cir. 1990)).  Although we are not
suggesting that the district court should only consider the
prosecutor’s strike of Juror No. 1 on remand, we do note that if
Juror No. 1, and only Juror No.1, was struck because of his race,
then the Batson challenge should have been sustained.
The error here is compounded by the court’s refusal to
allow evidence of the alleged conversations between the
prosecutor and defense counsel that could have supported the
defense counsel’s claim of bias.  That evidence, if accepted,
could have established that the prosecutor believed that he failed
to get a conviction in Coombs’ first trial only because of a
31
sympathetic Black juror.  Such evidence, viewed against the
prosecutor’s explanation that he “just didn’t like” one of the
prospective jurors (who he  conceded he had no good reason to
strike) may well have caused an objective fact finder to
conclude that Coombs’ Batson challenge should have been
sustained.  
We realize, of course, that defense counsel was able to
put the alleged out of court statement of the prosecutor before
the court in an affidavit.  However, that is a woefully inadequate
substitute for a hearing under these circumstances.  Moreover,
it is obvious that the court had already determined that the
Batson challenge was more irritating than meritorious.  It had
already explained that the proffered evidence was “not relevant
to anything” even though it went directly to the prosecutor’s
frame of mind in exercising peremptory challenges during the
selection of the second jury.  Thus, we cannot say that merely
      The state argues that this evidence should be excluded as9
hearsay evidence, a determination not made by the state trial
court.  However, the evidence was clearly offered to establish
the prosecutor’s state of mind.  It was not offered to establish
that a Black juror actually refused to convict Coombs during
the first trial. Therefore, it is not hearsay.  Fed. R. Evid.
801(c) (defining hearsay as statements “offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted”). 
       We assume that, on remand, the district court will give
the evidence whatever weight it deserves notwithstanding the
court’s initial inclination to ignore it as “not relevant to
anything.”  
32
allowing defense counsel a pro forma opportunity to submit an
affidavit is consistent with the kind of serious inquiry required
under Batson’s third step.9
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, we will remand the case to the district
court to hold an evidentiary hearing consistent 
     “We do not have authority under the federal habeas10
statutes, 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254, to remand a habeas
corpus petition to a state court for an evidentiary hearing.” 
Keller v. Petsock, 853 F.2d 1122, 1129 (3d Cir. 1988).
33
 with this opinion.   10
